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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaint i f f -Respondent , : Case No. 860273-CA 
v# i 
JOSEPH GREG TRUJILLO, t Category No, 2 
Defendant-Appellant. ; 
The sole issue presented in the State's petition for 
rehearing is whether the Court, by failing to apply the 
applicable rule of criminal procedure, incorrectly analyzed the 
fourth amendment issue in concluding that the trial court was 
required to suppress the challenged evidence. 
£XAX£NfillZ-fiE-Xfi£_£&££ 
Defendant, Joseph Greg Trujillo, was charged with 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third-
degree felony, in -*. * . . ' . - . . * 03 (1978). 
After a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of the 
charged offense. The trial court sentenced him to the Utah State 
Prison for a term of zero to five years. 
SXAXfiMEiiX-QE-E&GXS 
The State agrees with the facts set out in the Court's 
opinion except in the tallowing particulars: 
First, when Officer Beesley observed defendant and his 
companions walking down the street, he also observed defendant 
and his friends look over at the patrol car (R. 36), Only afifiX 
defendant saw the officer did he shift the knapsack in what 
appeared to be an effort to conceal it (R. 36-37) • 
Second, aside from the car prowls that had occurred in 
the area which the Court noted in its opinion, Beesley also 
testified that it was "a high-crime area. It's known for break-
ins at businesses..." (R. 52). 
Third, while it is not entirely clear from the record, 
and this Court states that Beesley did not inquire about the 
contents of the knapsack, it appears that Beesley may have 
inquired of defendant what was in the bag before he frisked 
defendant (R. 55, 69)• While defendant's testimony did not 
appear to be entirely credible, defendant also claimed that 
Beesley searched the bag prior to the frisk and the trial court 
may well have chosen to believe defendant on that point (R. 69-
70) . 
SUMMaBX_QE-&BSm$EO 
Because the Court failed to analyze the suppression 
issue under Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g), the State's petition for 
rehearing should be granted. 
1MBQQUQXIQH 
This petition for rehearing is submitted pursuant to 
otah R. ct. App. 35. in fixfiBn-JU-Eickaid# denying-tehisr 4 Utah 
292, 11 P. 512 (1886), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the 
standard for determining whether a petition for rehearing should 
be granted: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or 
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that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing. 
4 Utdh a t 294, 11 V • ut S1 I ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) , In CumflLinaS-JU 
JSifilfifiH# 42 Utah 1 5 7 , 129 P. 619 (1913) , the Supreme Court 
s t a t e d : 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of rightf and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions 
for rehearings in proper cases. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the 
result. . . • If there are some reasons, 
however, such as we have indicated above, or 
other good reasons, a petition for a 
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it 
is meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624. The argument portion of this 
brief will demonstrate that, based on these standards, the 
State•s pe ti t ion for rehearing is proper J y befor e the Coin: t and 
should be granted. 
EQIHLI 
IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED 
TO SUPPRESS THE CHALLENGED EVIDENCE, THE 
COURT OVERLOOKED THE CONTROLLING RULE OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
In analyzing the fourth amendment issue defendant 
presented and ruling that the trial court was required to 
suppress the knife seized from defendants person, this Court 
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overlooked Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) i f the controlling rule for all 
motions to suppress evidence for an allegedly unlawful search or 
seizure. Although originally enacted by the legislature, Rule 
12(g) was formally adopted by the Utah Supreme Court as a rule of 
procedure in In_££JL Bul£S_2f-.El2£fidiiJLS9 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(1985)f pursuant to its rulemaking authority under Article VIII, 
Section 4 of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, the trial court's 
ruling must be reviewed in the context of that rule. SfiS £Jta££ 
x
 Rule 12(g) provides: 
(1) In any motion concerning the admissibility of evidence 
or the suppression of evidence pursuant to this section or at 
trial/ upon grounds of unlawful search and seizure, the 
suppression of evidence shall not be granted unless the court 
finds the violation upon which it is based to be both a 
substantial violation and not committed in good faith. The court 
shall set forth its reasons for such finding. 
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shall in all cases be 
deemed substantial if one or more of the following is established 
by the defendant or applicant by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) The violation was grossly negligent, willful, 
malicious, shocking to the conscience of the court or was a 
result of the practice of the law enforcement agency pursuant to 
a general order of that agency: 
(ii) The violation was intended only to harass without 
legitimate law enforcement purposes. 
(3) In determining whether a peace officer was acting in 
good faith under this section, the court shall consider, in 
addition to any other relevant factors, some or all of the 
following: 
(i) The extent of deviation from legal search and seizure 
standards; 
(ii) The extent to which exclusion will tend to deter 
future violations of search and seizure standards; 
(iii) Whether or not the officer was proceeding by way of a 
search warrant, arrest warrant, or relying on previous specific 
directions of a magistrate or prosecutor; or 
(iv) The extent to which privacy was invaded. 
(4) If the defendant or applicant establishes that the 
search or seizure was unlawful and substantial by a preponderance 
of the evidence, the peace officer or governmental agency must 
then, by a preponderance of the evidence, prove the good faith 
actions of the peace officer. 
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IJL CaSi r ^ IU all Anil , „ IVi I I I! , I" M . ,i „ . I''l • 
App 1 y II | I i e c o y m z i n y t h a t Mule 12(g) i s trie a p p l i c a b l e r u l o 
for s u p p r e s s i o n i s s u e s jn t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e c o n t e x t ) , c s i i x 
DfiDdlDii >'« « " «l - " ' N ll " ' ' > " . * 
R u l e 1 2 ( v i )
 f w h u h a p p l i e s e q u a l l y t o s u p p r e s s i o n 
m o t i o n s b rough t under t h e f o u r t h amendment and a r t i c l e 1, s e c t i o n 
1 i, i ! il  II in I l l I in In f i » n s t in I MI il in i i n | in i i in i i i ( ! <i ,h i I i n 1 1 m i l t in mi f i I i i i w t MI I l y 
s e i z e d e v i d e n c e only where t h e p o l i c e o f l i c e i ' s v i o l a t i o n i s bo th 
s u b s t a n t i a l and not commit ted < 1 f a . i i h . That, means a c o u r t 
iiius! d e t e r m i n e whet ii nuiii'it .jniro;, p r e s e n t e d „ the 
o f f i c e r ' s c o n d u c t wa. - D j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e b e f o r e a d e c i s i o n on 
s u p p r e s s i o n i s made, " - . " i n s i s t e n t w i t h f e d e r a l c a s e law 
recogi ii z i i Ig c gooc\ t • iI t h e x c e p t i i>n t o t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y ru 1 e i n 
b o t h t h e w a r r a n t and w a r r a n t l e s s c o n t e x t s . Sfifi I l l i a f l l S - l j i 
K m i l r U • S 1 0 7 S • C t . 116 C (1 9 87) [ w< ir i: ai i, 1 ] c t 51 ; 
c o n t e x t ) ; I2ni£fid_SJ;a£fiS_Xj^Lfifln r 468 D .s 89 ? {] 984) ( w a r r a n t 
c o n t e x t ) ; Uni£e£_£Jta:tSS-X*«HilliafflJ5f 6 22 P . 2d 83 0 ( 5 th 
19R'M
 r gei t . JUIU! " ' . ' " I I ' - .i .n,t h s - . 3 
The q u e s t i o n ut whether r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n to make an 
i n v e s t i g a t o r y s t o p e x i s t s in any q iven f a c t s i t u a t i o n IK o f t e n a 
d i l t i t u l t one , Uue need only o o I I i l e b i o i L d l a i t < d i s c u s s i o n 
* *ww -iv. i w, ew.^ .« wwui i t s r e s p o n s i v e b r i e f al so f a i l € • ::! t : 
a n a l y s t t n - * . i i r e s s i o n is r~ue under Rule 1 2 ( g ) . 
J
 A. , ^ J t - . i . i r i ; , ^ o n c e r n i n y t h e v a l i d i t y of Rule 12(g) are n o t 
p r o p e r l y t e i v i e t n i s Court# i t b e i n g bound by a r u l e of p r o c e d u r e 
c o p i e d by t h e Otah Supreme C o u r t . Moreove r , t h e Supreme C o u r t 
h - s pend ing b e f o r e i t t h e q u e s t i o n of Rule 12(g) f s 
c u i i t > L i t u t i o n a l i t y . Ssfi S t a t e v . B a b b e l l f U t . Sup, C t . No, 23 0 3 3 , 
B r i e f of Respondent a t 23-42 ( a t t a c h e d a s an addendum t o t h i s 
p e t i t i o n . ) 
. 5 . 
in LaFave, £eaiSh-aD3_£siZU£S § 9.3(c) (19 87) (hereinafter 
"LaFave") of the reasonable suspicion requirement that attaches 
to investigatory stops to realize that what constitutes 
reasonable suspicion is not always clear. QQmsaLSr £*S.i.f State 
JU-BfiliflD* 441 So.2d 1195 (La. 1983) (grounds to stop defendant 
who fled when police approached outside a cafef a notorious 
narcotics outlet) , CStix dfinlfidr 466 U.S. 953 (1984) , YllLh EfiQBlfi 
*A_&ls2lidS£# 35 Cal.3d 473, 198 Cal. Rptr. 538, 674 P.2d 240 
(1984) (defendant's flight from parking lot of liquor store 
commonly used for drug transactions when confronted by police not 
grounds for detention of defendant). More specific to the 
instant case is the following summary from LaFave: 
Another rather common situation is that in 
which police suspicions are based in whole or 
in part upon the reactions of the suspect in 
response to the appearance of police in the 
vicinity. Police are trained to be 
suspicious of such reactions/ and stops are 
not infrequently made because of them. As 
one empirical study concluded: "A person who 
manifests concern for the presence of the 
police, who repeatedly glances at the 
officer, who changes his direction in an 
apparent attempt to avoid confronting the 
officer, or who flees at the sight of an 
officer will commonly be detained and 
questioned." It is not to be doubted that 
such reactions may be taken into account by 
the police and that together with other 
suspicious circumstances these reactions may 
well justify a stopping for investigation. 
Courts have so held when persons already 
suspected to some degree kept a watch upon 
the police, turned to conceal something from 
the police, tried to conceal themselves from 
the police, or drove away, ran away or walked 
off at a fast pace upon the approach of the 
police. 
LaFave, fiUBt.3 at 448-49 (footnote citations omitted). 
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Given aJ L t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s apparent • : ^er in 
t h e i n s t a n t c ase—'inc luding the 1 a t e h o u r
 f r e c e n t re p o r t *• i : 
prowls in the a r e a
 f de£ endant ' s act i oi is zoncern::i ng h i s knapsack 
a f t e r he saw the poJ :i < ::e • :>ff icer f the lack of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of ' 
two of t h e g r o u p f s members # and t h e g roup ' s n e r v o u s n e s s - - a n d the 
s om ew h a t am.b i g i i o \ :i s c a s e J aw a :i: i a 1 y z i n g s i m i ] a r • ::: i r c \ 1 m s t a n c e s i i i 
t h e c o n t e x t :> f i: u 1 i n g o i i t h e v a l i d i ty o f a n i n v e s t i g a t o r y s t o ]: > r 
t h e r e i s a s u b s t a n t i a 1 q u e s t i o n about whe the r the t r i a l c o u r t was 
obJ :i g a t e d i in :ier lit :i 1 e J Ilun i t *, ;, i, i * v\i I i HI 
d e f e n d a n t . 
Thereforer t he State respectfu 3 1 y requests thatf 
p . . C1 ! ! |: j: 3 5 ( : )
 f t h :i s C o i I r I: g r an t the j •e t i 1 : :i < :>i i 
for rehearing and alJ ow complete briefing from both parties on 
the application of Rule 12' * c K suppression issue. 
Based upon the foregc: j argument, the State's petition 
for rehearinq should be granted. 
The State certifies that this petition ir presented *~ 
good faith and not for delay, 
R E S P F I C T I ' M I I . I . Y s u l m i I I I i»i«l I h i •
 t £ M , i 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
attorney General 
-7-
MAILIMS-CBEIIEIC&IJB 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Kendall S. Peterson, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 333 
South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this day of 
July, 1987. 
^ ^ O Z ^ 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
WILLIAM B. BABBELL, 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
Case No. 21033 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS OF TWO COUNTS OF 
AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT, A FIRST DEGREE 
FELONY, AND ONE COUNT OF AGGRAVATED KID-
NAPPING, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
236 S t a t e C a p i t o l 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114 
A t t o r n e y s for Respondent 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assn. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
B. Rule 12(g) . Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
As part of h i s argument on appeal, defendant contends 
that the evidence he chal lenges should have been excluded under 
Dtah R. Crim P. 1 2 ( g ) . 8 Although defendant does not challenge 
the appropriateness or c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of Rule 1 2 ( g ) , given 
that t h i s Court has never f u l l y discussed the ru le , the State 
w i l l f i r s t examine the current s ta tus of t h i s modified 
exclusionary rule in Utah's criminal j u s t i c e system* The 
quest ion of whether exc lus ion was required under Rule 12(g) w i l l 
then be addressed. 
8 Rule 12(g) provides: 
(1) In any motion concerning the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence or 
the suppression of evidence pursuant t o t h i s s ec t ion or at t r i a l , 
upon grounds of unlawful search and se i zure , the suppression of 
evidence sha l l not be granted unless the court f inds the 
v i o l a t i o n upon which i t i s based t o be both a substant ia l 
v i o l a t i o n and not committed in good fa i th* The court shal l s e t 
forth i t s reasons for such f inding . 
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shal l in a l l cases be deemed 
subs tant ia l i f one or more of the fol lowing i s e s tab l i shed by the 
defendant or applicant by a preponderance of the evidence: 
( i ) The v i o l a t i o n was gross ly neg l igent , w i l l f u l , mal ic ious , 
shocking t o the conscience of the court or was a re su l t of the 
pract ice of the law enforcement agency pursuant t o a general 
order of that agency; 
( i i ) The v i o l a t i o n was intended only to harass without 
l e g i t i m a t e law enforcement purposes. 
(3) In determining whether a peace o f f i cer was act ing in good 
f a i t h under t h i s s e c t i o n , the court sha l l consider, in addit ion 
to any other relevant f a c t o r s , some or a l l of the fo l lowing: 
( i ) The extent of deviat ion from l e g a l search and se izure 
standards; 
( i i ) The extent to which exclus ion w i l l tend t o deter future 
v i o l a t i o n s of search and seizure standards; 
( i i i ) Whether or not the o f f i c er was proceeding by way of a 
search warrant, arrest warrant, or re ly ing on previous s p e c i f i c 
d i r e c t i o n s of a magistrate or prosecutor; or 
( i v ) The extent t o which privacy was invaded. 
(4) I f the defendant or applicant e s t a b l i s h e s that the search 
or se izure was unlawful and subs tant ia l by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the peace o f f i cer or governmental agency must then, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, prove the good f a i t h ac t ions of 
the peaoe o t f i c e r . 
23-
At the out se t , i t i s necessary to summarize the 
l e g i s l a t i v e h i s tory of Rule 12(g) and t h i s Court's treatment of 
i t in the case law. In 1982, the l e g i s l a t u r e enacted Rule 12(g) 
as part of the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act (1982 Utah Lavs 
ch. 1 0 , SS 1 - 1 6 ) . During the time that Rule 12(g) operated as a 
l e g i s l a t i v e l y enacted rule of criminal procedure, t h i s Court 
never ruled upon i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . See State v . Anderson# 
701 P.2d at 1103. In September 1985, the Court in In Re; Rules 
of Procedure. 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1985) , adopted a l l e x i s t i n g 
s tatutory r u l e s of procedure not i n c o n s i s t e n t with procedural 
ru l e s previously adopted by the Court. This adminis trat ive 
rul ing was made in response t o the amendments t o a r t i c l e VIII , 
s e c t i o n 4 of the Utah Const i tut ion 9 which were approved by the 
v o t e r s in November 1984 and became e f f e c t i v e on Ju ly 1 , 1985. 
See Compiler's Notes, UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, Replacement Vol . 1A at 
58 (Supp. 1986) . The amendments t o a r t i c l e VIII 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d the Court's rule-making author i ty , which had 
previously only been accorded by s t a t u t e . See UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-2-4 (1977) (amended 1986); 1943 Utah Laws ch. 3 3 , S 1 (which 
gave the Court rule-making power i n a l l c i v i l a c t i o n s ) . Since 
rece iv ing f u l l rule-making power in 1943, the Court apparently 
' A r t i c l e VIII , s e c t i o n 4 now provides in pert inent part: 
The supreme court shal l adopt r u l e s of procedure 
and evidence to be used in the courts of the s t a t e 
and sha l l by ru le manage the appe l la te process . The 
l e g i s l a t u r e may amend the ru les of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the supreme court upon a vote of 
two-thirds of a l l members of both houses of the 
l e g i s l a t u r e . • . . 
24-
has never independently devised and adopted rules of criminal 
procedure; the l e g i s l a t u r e has h i s t o r i c a l l y performed t h i s task. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. S 105-1-1 fit fi£fl. (1943); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
1-1 £ t Afifl- (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-1-1 fit fififl. (1978); UTAH 
CODE ANN. S 77-35-1 fit fififl. (1982) .10 This has not been the case 
with the ru le s of c i v i l procedure or the r u l e s of evidence. See 
State v . Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1332-33 (Utah 1986); prickyarfl 
Homeowners' Ass 'n . v. Gibbons Realtvi 668 P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 
1983) . In Re; Rules of Procedure marks the f i r s t time that the 
Court has independently adopted ru les of criminal procedure; and 
i t did so through an apparent wholesale adoption of the 
l e g i s l a t i v e l y enacted ru les contained in UTAH COM; ANN. § 77-35-1 
fit seq . (1982). There being no previously Court-adopted ru le s of 
criminal procedure, the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s ru les presumably are now 
the Court's ru les—unqual i f i ed . Therefore, the S ta te i s 
proceeding on the assumption that Rule 12(g) i s in place as a 
rule of criminal procedure formally adopted by t h i s Court, and 
that i t i s the contro l l ing ru le for a l l motions t o suppress 
evidence for an a l l eged ly unlawful search or s e i z u r e . See State 
v . Hygh > 711 P.2d at 2'T3 (Zimmerman, J . , concurring separately) 
("I have found no case in which t h i s Court has decided t o adopt 
the exclusionary rule after independently analyzing the quest ion 
of what remedy i s ava i lab le for an unlawful search or se izure 
1° In 1980, the l e g i s l a t u r e , for the f i r s t t ime, s p e c i f i c a l l y 
designated the r u l e s of criminal procedure and s e t them apart in 
chapter 35 of t i t l e 77 , 
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under our state const i tut ion") , 1 1 
Having said th i s , two issues require this Court's 
consideration: (1) To what extent i s the traditional 
exclusionary rule required under the federal constitution or the 
state constitution? (2) Is Rule 12(g) , the Court's rule, a 
permissible remedy for a violat ion of the accused's rights under 
the fourth amendment and ar t i c l e I, section 14? These issues are 
raised by the State because this Court has never ful ly discussed 
i t s rationale for applying an exclusionary rule for unlawful 
searches and seizures in cases prior to i t s adoption of Rule 
12(g) , or disclosed i t s rationale for adopting Rule 12(g) , which 
represents a clear departure from the exclusionary rule the Court 
has tradit ional ly applied. The State simply offers the following 
analysis as support for the Court's adoption of Rule 12(g)• 
The State ' s approach to these issues w i l l not be an 
original one. Four helpful law review ar t i c l e s on the 
exclusionary rule wi l l be rel ied upon in developing the 
discussion that follows—Coe, "The ALI Substantiality Test: A 
Flexible Approach to the Exclusionary Sanction," 10 Ga. L. Rev. 1 
(1975)? Kaplan, "The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule," 26 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1027 (1974); Schroeder, "Deterring Fourth Amendment 
Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule," 69 Geo. L.J. 
1361 (1981); and Stewart, "The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: 
The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in 
Search-and-Seizure Cases," 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365 (1983). The 
11 Justice Zimmerman's concurrence was issued prior to the 
issuance of In Re: Rules of Procedure. 
focus here wi l l be s l ight ly different from that in other briefs 
on the subject recently f i l ed by the State in State v. Mendoza. 
Case No. 20922, a case currently pending before the Court. 
Although the Mendoza briefs provide a good starting point for a 
discussion of Rule 12(g), they do not address pertinent questions 
regarding the necessity of an exclusionary rule under our state 
constitution. Accordingly, the State urges the Court to consider 
the State1 s arguments in Mendoza in l ight of the discussion of 
Rule 12(g) presented here. 
Three Supreme Court cases are generally credited with 
producing the exclusionary rule—Boyd v. United States* 116 U.S. 
616 (1886); Adams v. New York. 192 U.S. 585 (1904); Weeks v. 
United States . 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The fa ir ly narrow rule that 
emerged from that trilogy of cases was signif icantly broadened in 
subsequent cases, culminating in Agnello v. United States . 269 
U.S. 20 (1925), which held that contraband seized in violat ion of 
the fourth amendment could not be used as evidence in a federal 
criminal t r i a l . However, none of the Court's opinions clearly 
identif ied the doctrinal basis for the exclusionary rule. Then 
in Wolf v. Colorado. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court made clear 
that the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
the police i s ' implic i t in the concept of ordered l iberty ," and 
therefore enforceable against the states through the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although it for the f i r s t 
tine exp l i c i t l y treated the question of the exclusion of 
i l l e g a l l y seized evidence as a matter of remedies, apart from the 
fight secured by the fourth amendment, the Court in Wolf refused 
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t o impose the f edera l ly fashioned exclusionary rule on the s t a t e s 
as the part icular remedy for uncons t i tu t iona l ly se i zed evidence. 
The j £ d i majority recognized that other "equally e f f e c t i v e * s t a t e 
methods for deterring unreasonable searches and s e i z u r e s would 
s u f f i c e . 338 U.S. at 3 1 / 
However, in 1961 the Court in Mapp v . Ohio. 367 U.S. 
643 (1961) , overruled the pert inent port ions of Wolf and held 
that the exclusionary rule was appl icable to s t a t e criminal 
prosecut ions: 
Today we once again examine Wolf* s c o n s t i t u -
t iona l documentation of the right to privacy 
from unreasonable s t a t e i n t r u s i o n and, 
af ter i t s dozen years on our books, are l e d 
by i t to c lose the only courtroom door re -
maining open t o evidence secured by o f f i c i a l 
l awles sness in f lagrant abuse of that bas ic 
r igh t , reserved t o a l l persons as a s p e c i f i c 
guarantee against that very same unlawful 
conduct. We hold that a l l evidence obtained 
by searches and s e i z u r e s in v i o l a t i o n of the 
Const i tut ion i s , by that same author i ty , 
inadmiss ible in a s t a t e court . 
367 U.S. a t 654-55. F i n a l l y , in a recent dec i s ion the Court 
c l e a r l y rejected the premise upon which Mapp seemed t o re s t— 
i . e . , that the exclusionary rule was a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y required 
remedy. In United S t a t e s v . Leon. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) , i t 
s t a t e d : 
The Fourth Amendment contains no provis ion 
express ly precluding the use of evidence 
obtained in v i o l a t i o n of i t s commands, and 
an examination of i t s or ig in and purposes 
makes c lear that the use of f r u i t s of a 
past unlawful search or se izure "work Is] no 
new Fourth Amendment wrong." United S t a t e s 
Yt Chandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 354 (1974) . The 
wrong condemned by the Amendment i s "ful ly 
accomplished" by the unlawful search or 
se i zure i t s e l f , ib id .» and the exclusionary 
ru le i s ne i ther intended nor able to "cure 
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the invasion of the defendant's r i g h t s which 
he has already suf fered." Stone v. Powell, 
supra, at 540 (WHITE, J. , d i s s e n t i n g ) . mhS. 
rule thus operates as "a j u d i c i a l l y created 
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
r ights general ly through i t s deterrent e f f e c t . 
rather than a personal cons t i tu t iona l r ight 
of the person aggrieved." United S t a t e s V* 
Calandrat guprfr, a t 348. 
468 U.S. at 916 (emphasis added). Thus, now that i t i s s e t t l e d 
that the exclusionary ru le i s not required by the federal 
c o n s t i t u t i o n , the immediate quest ion confronting s t a t e appel late 
courts i s whether the ru le i s required by the i r individual s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n s . 
As with the fourth amendment, a r t i c l e I, s ec t ion 14 
contains no provis ion express ly excluding from a criminal t r i a l 
evidence that has been obtained in v i o l a t i o n of i t s commands. 
Prior t o the Supreme Court's dec i s ion in Mapp, which extended the 
federal exclusionary rule to s t a t e criminal prosecut ions , t h i s 
Court, after a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the ques t ion , express ly held 
that evidence should not be excluded even though i t was obtained 
as a r e s u l t of an i l l e g a l search and s e i z u r e . S ta te v. Aime. 62 
Utah 476 , 478-b5, 220 P. 704 , 705-08 (1923) . £ge a lso State v . 
JEaLl, 10 Utah 2d 365, 353 P.2d 615 (1960). This pos i t i on was in 
l i n e with the majority view held by s t a t e courts at that time. 
MBLSr 62 Utah at 480-81 , 220 P. at 706. It was not u n t i l Mapp 
had been decided that the Court recognized exc lus ion as the 
remedy for a v i o l a t i o n of the fourth amendment or a r t i c l e I , 
• e c t i o n 1 4 . State v . Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64, 66, 3 8? P#2d 240, 
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241-42 (1963), vacated on other grounds. 379 U.S. 1 (1964).12 
Since Louden, the Court has fa i thful ly applied the federally 
fashioned exclusionary rule in criminal cases. E.g. State v. 
fiaUfiaaEf 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985); St3te Vt Hflrrig, 671 P.2d 175 
(Utah 1983). However, the Supreme Court's s ignif icant 
modification of that rule in Leon, coupled with i t s clear 
statement there that the rule i s not constitutionally required, 
gives th is Court every reason to ful ly discuss the necessity of 
an exclusionary rule under the state constitution "and to explain 
why the recently adopted Rule 12(g) i s an appropriate rule. 
Three major rationales for the exclusionary rule in 
search-and-seizure cases have developed in the case law and legal 
l i t erature: (1) the remedial or personal right rationale; (2) 
the judicial integrity rationale; and (3) the deterrence 
rationale. Coe, supra at 14-24. Although a lengthy discussion 
of each of these rationales i s not possible here, some attention 
should be given them so that a foundation may be la id for a 
meaningful analysis of Rule 12(g)—a rule which retains exclusion 
as a remedy where the search-and-seizure v io lat ion i s both 
substantial and not committed in good fa i th . £_££ Rule 12(g) (1) . 
12 Louden could be read as adopting the exclusionary rule as the 
sole remedy for an unlawful search or seizure under the s tate 
constitution. However, by simply c i t ing to Mapp. the Court 
appears to have lumped the state and federal provisions together 
without giving much thought to the independent state 
constitutional question. Therefore, the State believes that 
Justice Zimmerman was correct in Hyoh when he observed that there 
appeared to be "no case in which th is Court ha[d] decided to 
adopt the exclusionary rule after independently analyzing the 
question of what remedy i s available for unlawful search or 
seizure under our State Constitution." 711 P.2d at 273. 
The remedial or personal right ra t iona le embraces the 
notion that the exc lus ion of evidence i s a r ight inherent in the 
personal cons t i tu t iona l right t o be f ree from unreasonable 
searches and seizures* However, despite some degree of support, 
the remedial or compensatory j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the exclusionary 
ru l e has general ly been re jec ted , Coe, supra at 15; Schroeder, 
supra at 1426* But see State v . Johnson, 716 P.2d at 1297 n. 11; 
S ta te v. Grawein, 123 Wis.2d 428, 431-32, 367 N.W.2d 816, 817-18 
(Wis. App. 1985) ( c i t i n g Sta te v . Kreiobaum, 194 Wis. 229, 232 , 
215 N.W. 896, 897*98 (1927)) ; S ta te v. White, 97 Wash.2d 92 , 110, 
640 P.2d 1061, 1071 (1982) . A frequently c i t e d flaw in t h i s 
theory i s that the t e x t of the fourth amendment does not d i r e c t l y 
require exc lus ion; nor i s there anything in the events giving 
r i s e t o the adoption of the fourth amendment that supports the 
view that i t was intended t o require exc lus ion . Stewart, supra 
at 1381. As noted e a r l i e r , the Supreme Court c l ear ly re jec ted 
t h i s theory in Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. Because a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 
14 , l i k e the fourth amendment, contains no textual requirement 
for exc lus ion and there appears t o be nothing in the h i s tory of 
i t s adoption t o ind icate that exc lus ion of evidence would be 
required for a v i o l a t i o n of the provis ion, t h i s Court should 
again r e j e c t the remedial or personal r ight rat iona le as a 
cons t i tu t iona l b a s i s for the exclusionary rule , as i t did, for 
a l l prac t i ca l purposes, in Aime, 62 Utah at 480-85 , 220 P. 706-
0 8 . 
The theory that exclus ion i s necessary to preserve 
j u d i c i a l i n t e g r i t y has a l s o received much c r i t i c i s m and has 
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general ly played only a minor ro le in the development of the 
exclusionary rule* Coe, supra a t 17* The notion underlying t h i s 
theory was perhaps best a r t i c u l a t e d in the dissent of Jus t i ce 
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United S t a t e s . 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J . , d i s sen t ing ) ! 
Our Government i s the potent , the omnipresent 
teacher . For good or for i l l , i t teaches the 
whole people by i t s example. . . . If the 
Government becomes a lawbreaker, i t breeds 
contempt for law; i t i n v i t e s every man t o 
become a law unto himself; i t i n v i t e s anarchy. 
In t h a t same case, Jus t ice Holmes wrote in h i s d issent ing 
opinion: 
We have to choose, and for my par t I think 
i t l e s s evi l that some criminals should 
escape than t h a t the Government should play 
an ignoble p a r t . 
277 U.S. a t 470. 
Although some courts continue to recognize the j ud i c i a l 
i n t e g r i t y r a t iona le as the most compelling j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the 
exclusionary ru le , see , e .g . . State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. 
Super, a t 244, 491 A.2d a t 45, i t i s subject t o the same a t tack 
as i s the personal r ight r a t i o n a l e — i . e . , there appears t o be no 
cons t i tu t iona l bas is for i t , e i ther t ex tua l ly or h i s t o r i c a l l y . 
Stewart, supra at 1383. H i s to r i ca l ly , courts have in a va r ie ty 
of circumstances admitted i l l e g a l l y obtained evidence, apparently 
not overly concerned t h a t to do so would necessar i ly involve the 
court in "dir ty bus iness ." I b i d . t Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 
486 (1976) (observing t h a t the fourth amendment "has never been 
in te rp re ted to proscribe the in t roduct ion of i l l e g a l l y seized 
evidence in a l l proceedings or against a l l persons") ; Coe, supra 
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at 17 . This c r i t i c i s m appears sound, and although there i s a 
good deal of merit t o the value judgment inherent in the j u d i c i a l 
i n t e g r i t y doctr ine , i t does not provide a sound cons t i tu t iona l 
bas i s for the exclusionary r u l e . Indeed, the j u d i c i a l i n t e g r i t y 
r a t i o n a l e was e x p l i c i t l y rejected as an independent 
cons t i tu t iona l bas i s for the exclusionary rule by the Supreme 
Court in Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 433 , 450 n. 25 (1974) . The 
t e x t and his tory of a r t i c l e I , s e c t i o n 14 demand no d i f f erent 
conclusion by t h i s Court. 
The deterrence ra t iona le i s with l i t t l e * d o u b t the most 
widely accepted j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the exclusionary r u l e . In 
Leon, the Supreme Court made c lear that i t perceived deterrence 
as the only purpose for the r u l e . 468 U.S. at 906. Numerous 
s t a t e courts have taken a s imilar pos i t i on regarding t h e i r own 
exclusionary r u l e s . See , e . g . # Mers v. S t a t e , 482 N.E.2d 778, 
782-83 (Ind. App. 1985) j S ta te v . Wood. 457 So.2d 206, 210-11 
(La. App. 1984); S ta te v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 391-92, 630 P.2d 
674, 67B-/9 (1981) , c e r t , denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (recognizing 
that , although other reasons for i t s use e x i s t , the primary 
purpose of Idaho's exclusionary rule i s t o deter po l ice 
misconduct). The freon dec i s ion and a number of s t a t e court 
opinions , e f g y State v . Brown. 708 So.2d at 146; Stringer v . 
SJtalfii 491 So.2d 837, 847 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J . , 
concurring) , r e f l e c t the majority, and probably better reasoned, 
view that the deterrence r a t i o n a l e , l i k e the other r a t i o n a l e s , 
has no readi ly d i s c e r n i b l e bas i s in the federal c o n s t i t u t i o n or 
the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s . On the other hand, J u s t i c e Potter 
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Stewart has articulated what i s perhaps the most compelling 
counterargument to that view: 
To give effect to the Constitution's prohi-
bition against i l l ega l searches and seizures/ 
i t may be necessary for the judiciary to 
remove the incentive for violat ing it* Thus, 
i t may be argued that although the Constitu-
tion does not exp l i c i t l y provide for exclu-
sion, the need to enforce the Constitution's 
l imi t s on government—to preserve, the rule 
of law—requires an exclusionary rule. Under 
th is third •doctrinal" basis for the exclu-
sionary rule, which has been described as 
•constitutional common law," the exclusion of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence i s not 
a constitutional right but a constitutional 
remedy. It i s a right only in the sense 
that every remedy vests a right in those 
who may claim i t . 
Stewart, supra at 1384. But even he qualif ied his argument by 
stat ing: 
Under such an approach, the determination 
whether the exclusionary rule i s constitu-
t ional ly required turns on whether there are 
other adequate remedies available to ensure 
that the government does not v io late the 
fourth amendment at i t s pleasure. 
Ibid. 
Assuming that th i s Court i s among those courts that see 
deterrence of police misconduct as the primary purpose of the 
exclusionary rule, a reasonable assumption given i t s recent 
adoption of Rule 12(g) (which, as discussed in more detail below, 
i s a deterrence-oriented, modified exclusionary rule ) , the Court 
should exp l i c i t l y hold that an exclusionary rule, in any form, i s 
not required either by ar t i c l e I, section 14, or any other 
provision in the state constitution, on a theory that exclusion 
i s a constitutional remedy premised upon the deterrence doctrine. 
Although Just ice Stewart's constitutional theory regarding the 
deterrence rationale i s not without some force, by adopting i t 
the Court would unnecessarily entangle i t s e l f in a l e s s than 
clear constitutional analysis. Elevating a question into the 
realm of a constitutional question, when that i s avoidable, i s 
not the preferred course. JSeg State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 
(Utah 1982), cert , denied, 459 U.S. 988. The preferable course 
for th i s Court would be to do as the Supreme Court did in Leon 
and recognize that th i s s ta te ' s exclusionary rule—which i s 
embodied in Rule 12(g)—operates as a judic ial ly created remedy 
designed to safeguard art ic le I, section 14 rights through i t s 
deterrent e f fect , rather than a personal constitutional right of 
the aggrieved person. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. Under th is 
approach, future modifications of Rule 12(g) , including the 
poss ib i l i ty of to ta l ly abandoning exclusion of evidence as a 
remedy for search-and-seizure v io lat ions , are more easi ly 
analyzed and adopted.13 
Finally, although the Court might also embrace the 
judicial integrity rationale as an additional nonconstitutional 
jus t i f i cat ion for the exclusionary rule, pee, e . g . , Johnson, 716 
P.2d at 1298, that would not be completely consistent with the 
tenor of Rule 12(g) , which allows the admission of i l l e g a l l y 
obtained evidence so long as the violat ion was insubstantial and 
committed in good fa i th . In short, of the three that have been 
13 por instance, if the Court were to conclude at some future 
date that adequate alternative remedies to the exclusionary rule 
e x i s t , i t could simply abandon the rule through i t s rule-making 
function without having to explain why a rule once required by 
the state constitution was no longer so required. 
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discussed, the deterrence rationale, viewed as a 
nonconstitutional doctrine, provides the clearest jus t i f i ca t ion 
for the exclusionary rule contained in Rule 12(g) . 
Having addressed the question of whether an 
exclusionary rule i s required under either the fourth amendment 
or ar t i c l e I, section 14, the next question i s whether Rule 12(g) 
i s a permissible remedy for a violat ion of a defendant's rights 
under the federal and state provisions. Because a state i s free 
to fashion whatever rule i t desires concerning v io lat ions of i t s 
state constitutional provision that are not also v io lat ions of 
the fourth amendment, the analysis of th i s issue wi l l focus on 
whether Rule 12(g) provides a permissible remedy for v iolat ions 
of the fourth amendment. By proceeding in t h i s way, the State i s 
assuming that the Court, by adopting Rule 12(g), believes i t to 
be an acceptable rule under state law for v io lat ions of ar t i c l e 
I, section 14. Thus, if the Court were to determine that certain 
police oonduct violated a r t i c l e I, section 14 even though i t did 
not v io late the fourth amendment, presumably Rule 12(g) would be 
the controlling rule on the issue of suppression. 
Under the Mapp ruling, as modified by Leon, the 
individual s tates are obligated to apply the federal exclusionary 
rule in cases of a fourth amendment v io la t ion . If federal law 
requires exclusion under the facts presented, the state court 
Bust exclude the evidence. In short, a s tate may not have a more 
narrow exclusionary rule than the federal rule when a fourth 
amendment v io lat ion i s at i s sue . Stringer v. State , 491 So.2d at 
847 (Robertson, J . , concurring). Therefore, i t must be 
determined whether Rule 12(g) , which obviously applies to 
v iolat ions of the fourth amendment, can be applied in a manner 
consistent with federal law. 
Rule 12(g) appears to be a hybrid rule which combines 
the substantial ity tes t suggested by the American Law Institute 
i n i t s MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1975) , s ee 
generally Coe, supra, and the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule articulated by the Supreme Court in freon 
(warrant context) and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) (warrantless context). It re f lec ts 
dissat is fact ion with automatic exclusion (which does not consider 
what deterrent e f fect , if any, exclusion wi l l have in the given 
case) as the reroedy for every search-and-seizure violat ion, the 
costs of which can be extremely high. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08; 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 490 ("The disparity in particular 
cases between the error committed by the police officer and the 
windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule 
i s contrary to the idea of proportionality that i s essential to 
the concept of j u s t i c e . * ) ; Schroeder, supra at 1424-25 
(summarizing the perceived costs of the exclusionary rule as 
follows: "(1) fostering delay in the system of jus t ice ; (2) 
encouraging police perjury; (3) diverting the attention of the 
participants in a criminal case from the question of gui l t or 
innocence; (4) freeing the gui l ty; and (5) generating disrespect 
for the law and the administration of just ice by granting 
windfall benefits to certain guilty defendants" (footnote 
37-
c i tat ions omitted)) . Instead, i t retains exclusion as a remedy 
for a substantial and bad fai th v io lat ion , recognizing that a 
beneficial deterrent effect i s realized through exclusion only 
under appropriate circumstances. Thus, Rule 12(g) embraces a 
principle that was central to the decision in Leon: avoidance of 
the high costs of the exclusionary rule where exclusion would not 
e f fect ive ly deter police misconduct. As stated in Leon; 
lElven assuming that the rule effect ively 
deters some police misconduct and provides 
incentives for the law enforcement profession 
as a whole to conduct i t s e l f in accord with 
the Fourth Amendment, i t cannot be expected, 
and should not be applied, to deter object-
ively reasonable law enforcement a c t i v i t y . 
468 U.S. at 918-19. ££. Stewart, supra at 1394 n. 155; Oaks, 
•Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure," 37 U. 
Chi# L. Rev. 665 (1970)—critics of the exclusionary rule who 
forcefully argue that i t does not in fact deter unconstitutional 
police conduct. Additionally, because the rule operates in 
conjunction with UTAH OODE ANN. SS 78-16-1 through -11 (Supp. 
1986) , which provide a c iv i l remedy for the defendant whose 
constitutional rights have been violated,* 4 i t s mandate for 
l imited exclusion i s consistent with the well reasoned view that, 
if adequate alternative remedies e x i s t , exclusion becomes l e s s 
necessary. £££ Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 
403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (outlining 
an alternative remedied scheme to the exclusionary ru le ) . 
1 4
 An aggrieved defendant could also seek damages from the police 
otficer under the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1983 
(1982). 
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Although the language of Rule 12(g) does not precisely 
track the good fa i th exception a r t i cu l a t ed in Leon and Williams, 
the g i s t of Utah 's subs tant ia l i ty /good fa i th rule i s the same as 
that set out in those cases ; and t h i s Court, through case law, 
can ensure tha t i t i s applied in a manner consistent with federal 
law. 1 5 For ins tance , in Leon the Court a t one point s ta ted in 
reference to appl ica t ion of the exclusionary ru l e : 
Pa r t i cu la r ly when law enforcement off icers 
have acted in objective good fa i th or t he i r 
t ransgress ions have been minor, the magnitude 
of the benefit conferred on such gui l ty defen-
dants offends basic concepts of the criminal j u s t i c e system. 
468 U.S. at 907-08 (c i t ing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. a t 490) 
(emphasis added). I t further noted: 
The Court has, to be sure, not ser iously ques-
tioned, "in the absence of a more efficacious 
sanction, the continued appl icat ion of the ru le 
to suppress evidence from the [prosecut ion 's] 
case where a Fourth Amendment v io la t ion has 
been subs tan t ia l and de l ibe ra t e . . . •" franks 
v> Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); Stone v. 
Powell, supra, a t 492. 
1* Some of the quest ions t h a t were asked the S t a t e ' s counsel 
during oral argument in S ta t e v. Mendoza, Case No. 20922 (argued 
June 12, 1986), suggest t h a t cer ta in members of the Court may not 
be e n t i r e l y s a t i s f i ed with the language of Rule 12(g) . However, 
i t i s the Cour t ' s r u l e , and if the ru le i s not s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
worded, the Court should amend i t . Aware of the possible 
concerns in t h i s regard, a t torneys from the Attorney General ' s 
Otfice plan to meet with represen ta t ives from the Statewide 
Association of Prosecutors and other members of the law 
enforcement community to discuss Rule 12(g) and perhaps p e t i t i o n 
for a ru le change, as the S ta t e has done with respect t o Utah R. 
Crim. P. 27 (see In Re: Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, S t a t e ' s Pe t i t ion for Amendment t o Rule ( f i led February 
19 , 1986)). If such a pe t i t i on i s f i l e d , the S ta t e wi l l a t tha t 
same time submit a complete memorandum discussing the 
exclusionary ru le and possible a l t e rna t i ve s t o i t . But for now, 
the S ta t e recognizes t h a t the Court has adopted current Rule 
12(g) , and therefore wi l l l im i t i t s discussion here t o the legal j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for tha t r u l e . 
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Id* at 908-09 (emphasis added). See a lso McFarland v . S t a t e , 284 
Ark. 533
 f 549 , 684 S.W.2d 233, 243 (1985) ( c i t i n g Leon with 
approval in applying Arkansas's substant ia l v i o l a t i o n rule for 
suppression of evidence (A.R.Cr.P. 16 .2 (e )—a rule patterned 
a f ter the ALl's s u b s t a n t i a l i t y t e s t ) ) . 
Furthermore, that the Supreme Court has not 
s p e c i f i c a l l y held tha t the Leon good f a i t h exception would apply 
in a warrantless context , as Rule 12(g) obviously would, the 
Court's general d i scuss ion in that case about the 'propr ie ty of a 
good f a i t h except ion strongly sugges t s that such an extens ion of 
Leon would be both acceptable and des i rab le . See 468 U.S. at 
918-19. 
Some courts have adopted a form of good f a i t h exception 
t o the exclusionary ru le in a warrantless search or se izure 
context . Seer e . g . , United S t a t e s v . Wyler. 502 F.Supp. 969, 
973-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) . The leading case i s s t i l l Williams where 
the Fifth Circui t held that evidence se ized from the defendant 
inc ident t o a warrant less a r r e s t , which was u l t imate ly determined 
to have been unlawful, should not be excluded because "evidence 
i s not to be suppressed under the exclus ionary ru le where i t i s 
discovered by o f f i c e r s in the course of ac t ions tha t are taken in 
good f a i t h and i n the reasonable , though mistaken, b e l i e f that 
they are authorized. • 622 F.2d a t 840 . The court analyzed the 
appropriateness of a good f a i t h except ion in much the same way 
that the Supreme Court did in Leon, emphasizing that the 
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary ru le i s not furthered i f 
the ru le i s appl ied t o s i t u a t i o n s where po l i ce o f f i c e r s have 
acted in the good faith belief that their conduct i s lawful. 622 
F.2d at 842. Numerous courts have cited Williams with approval. 
E.g. United States v. Cotton. 751 P.2d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (10th Cir. 
1985); Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co.. 695 P.2d 
1020, 1023-24 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nolan. 530 
P.Supp. 386, 398 (W.D. Pa. 1981), a f f 'd . 718 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 
1983); State v. Verkuvlen. 120 Wis.2d 59, 352 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. 
App. 1982); State v. Glass. 9 Ohio Misc.2d 10, 11 , 458 N.E.2d 
1302, 1304 (Ohio Com. PI. 1983). In short, the Williams opinion 
embodies the logical extension of Leon into the area of 
warrantless searches and seizures. It i s d i f f i cu l t to conceive 
of any compelling reason why the Supreme Court would not apply 
the Leon rule in a case where an of f icer ' s warrantless conduct, 
subsequently determined to be in v io lat ion of the fourth 
amendment, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 
£ej> I tNtS t Yt Lppez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1055-56 (1984) 
(White, J . , dissenting)j People v. Deitchman. 695 P.2d 1146, 1153 
(Colo. 1985) (Erickson, C.J., concurring) (observing that 
Colorado's statutory "good faith" exception to the exclusionary 
rule i s consistent with fourth amendment precedent and does not 
v io la te federal constitutional standards); Bloom, "United States 
v. Leon And I t s Ramifications," 56 Colo. L. Rev. 247, 259-61 
(1985). But see United States v. Whiting. 781 P.2d 692, 698-99 
(9th Cir. 1986) (refusing to extend Leon rationale to warrantless 
s i tuat ion) ; Greenhalgh, "The Warrantless Good Faith Exception— 
Unprecedented, Indefensible, and Devoid of Necessity,* 26 S. Tex. 
L.J. 129 (1985) . 
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Fina l ly r although i t does not bear on the federal 
cons t i tu t iona l i s s u e and r e l a t e s only t o the appropriateness of 
Rule 12(g) under the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n (which, as noted e a r l i e r , 
should not be an i s s u e i n that the Court, by adopting Rule 1 2 ( g ) , 
presumably b e l i e v e s that the ru le does not create any s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l problems), i t i s worth noting that a number of 
courts have adopted the Leon good f a i t h exception as part of 
their s t a t e exclusionary r u l e . S t a t e v. Brown, 708 So.2d at 145-
46; Mers v . S t a t e . 482 N.E.2d a t 782-83; McFarlantS v . S t a t e , 284 
Ark. at 549 , 684 S.W.2d at 243; S ta te v. Wood, 457 So.2d at 210-
11? S t a t e v . Bo l t . 142 Ariz. 260 , 689 P.2d 519 (1984) . But see 
People v. Bioelow, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630 , 636-37, 488 N.E.2d 451 , 457-
58 (1985); S t a t e v . Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 491 A.2d 37 
(1985); S t a t e v. Houston, 359 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Minn. App. 1984) — 
cases r e j e c t i n g Leon on s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l grounds. 
Based upon the foregoing d i scuss ion and the probable 
cause a n a l y s i s s e t forth in subsect ion A, the t r i a l court should 
not have excluded the challenged evidence under Rule 1 2 ( g ) . 
There simply was no showing that Caz ier ' s search pursuant t o a 
warrant cons t i tu ted a subs tant ia l and bad f a i t h v i o l a t i o n of 
d e f e n d a n t s r i g h t s . The warrant i ssued e i ther was supported by 
probable cause (thus no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n when Cazier 
executed i t ) , or i f determined t o be i n v a l i d due to the technical 
inadequacy of Cazier 9 s a f f i d a v i t , was reasonably r e l i e d upon by 
the o f f i c e r who, under an o b j e c t i v e reasonableness t e s t , had no 
b a s i s for b e l i e v i n g that the warrant was i n v a l i d . £&£ UTAH CODE 
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